FEAR AND DEGRADATION IN ALABAMA;
THE EMOTIONAL SUBTEXT OF UNIVERSITY OF
ALABAMA V. GARRETT"

Susan Bandes*

Scholars speak of University of Alabama v. Garrett' as a case about
diminishing access to courts for the disabled 2 ever-expanding sovereign immunity doctrine, the tightening of restrictions on the power
of Congress,4 the aggrandizement ofjudicial power, ' the New Federalism," and it is about all these things-it is an important opinion in the
Court's emerging Boerne/Section 5/sovereign immunity jurisprudence. But it becomes increasingly obvious that our familiar doctrinal tools-text, history, precedent, public policy-will take us only
so far in deciphering the Supreme Court majority's protective, even
reverential attitude toward the states' sovereign immunity. This article suggests that the increasingly emotive cast of the majority's
language about the states is itself worthy of attention, as are the numerous signals in the federalism opinions about its emotional commitments and blind spots: toward Congress, toward civil rights plaintiffs and civil rights statutes, and toward its own prerogatives.
A brief description of the Garrett case may be helpful. The petitioner Patricia Garrett was a state employee who contracted breast
cancer, was subjected to repeated negative comments about her illProfessor of Law, DePatul University College of Law. I wish to thank Ed Rubin and Susan
Feathers for putting together the superb symposium at which these papers were first presented,
the participants in the symposium for their helpful comments, and Robert Schapiro and Suzanna Sherry for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
l 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
2 See, e.g., Roger C. Hartley, Enforcing Federal Civil Rights Against Public Entities After Garrett,
28J.C.&U.L.41 (2001).
"1See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 161-62 (2002).
4 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN.
L.

REV. 87, 139 (2001); Evan Fl. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1152 (2001); Ruth Colker &James Brudney, DLssing Congress, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 80, 86 (2001); Neal Devins, Congressional Fact-Findingand the Scope of Judicial Review: A
PreliminaryAnalysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1173-74 (2001).
5 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Tmn, Foreword: We The Cour, 115 HARV.

L. REV. 4, 145-46 (2001).
6 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1053 (2001 ); see also Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federal-

isin, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 87C-78 (2001) (clisctIssing the sovereign immtmity decisions and New
Federalism).
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ness, and was then demoted from the job she had performed for seventeen years, though she could still do the work. The respondent
was the state entity, the University of Alabama, which was assumed,
for purposes of the suit, to have violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") in its treatment of Patricia Garrett."
Title I of the ADA permits suits by private citizens against states for
money damages, suits that would ordinarily be barred unless they fall
within Congress' power to abrogate sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that disparate
treatment toward the disabled need only satisfy the rational basis test
to pass constitutional muster!' In light of City of Boerne v. Flores,'I since
Congress sought to afford greater protection than was constitutionally required, its efforts to remedy discrimination against this group
were required to be congruent and proportional to the injury to be
prevented." Thus, much turned on the Court's view of the scope of
the injury-what patterns of conduct it identified and found commensurate with the legislative response.
If one reads Garrett for emotional content, it is not hard to find.
The opinion contains a veritable soap opera's worth of judicial emotion, including mistrust of Congress, indifference or hostility to the
underlying rights at stake, empathy for the states, the desire to protect the states from domination and degradation, arrogance about
the scope of the Court's own powers, and perhaps most noticeably,
extreme sensitivity toward assaults on its own dignity. Reading for
emotional content requires noticing the emotions that are lacking as
well, in this case the lack of concern toward the privations of individual plaintiffs or entire classes of plaintiffs.
But why read an opinion, like Garrett, or a set of opinions like
those constituting the Court's emerging sovereign immunity doctrine, for emotional content? I suggest that the values expressed inor implicit in-those opinions are both a product of and an expression of certain emotional assumptions and commitments. These
cases, as they redraw the boundaries between the Court and Congress, between federal and state government, are animated by empathy for some actors and lack of empathy toward others, by assumptions about who is worthy of trust, who is likely to act in bad faith, and
whose dignity needs protecting. The motivations the Court assumes
or demands, the empathetic connections it is willing to make, the
7
8

Brief for Petitioner at 16, Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No.
99-1240).
The case was consolidated on appeal with the case of another state employee,
Milton

Ash,
against the Alabama Department of Youth Services.
9 Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 (2001) (discussing ClebUrne v. Cleburne
Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
10521 U.S. 507 (1997).
1 Garrett,531 U.S. at 372.
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causal links it sees, and the resulting patterns it recognizes or declines
to recognize all are crucial to the creation of doctrine, yet cannot be
explained solely by reference to doctrinal factors.
Two points of clarification are in order. First, I am not arguing
that the Court (or any of its voting blocs) possesses the ability to express meaning or values, apart from the meaning or values embodied
in its opinions.'2 My concern is with the meaning and values transmitted by the Court, as an entity, in its decisions. As I hope to show,
in the federalism context these values are not merely expressive, if that
term is intended to describe attributes of form rather than consequence. The federalism decisions may well convey concerns about
form. For example, they may focus on the form of suits against the
state, and on whether that form connotes the proper respect for the
state's dignity.' 3 But if so, form cannot be easily separated from substance: the attitudes these decisions convey and embody have serious
substantive consequences for the parties, for the shape of doctrines
like sovereign immunity, and for the balance of federal/state relations in general.
Second, I do not mean to suggest criticism of the fact that the
Court's opinions do express particular values or emotional commitments." On the contrary I assume, as I have argued before, that emotional variables are an inevitable component of legal reasoning, and
one that may even be beneficial.' The problem is that the emotional
content of legal opinions tends to remain unexpressed," and thus insulated from debate. My purpose here is to suggest that these underlying emotional commitments have considerable explanatory power.

12

It is not necessary to enter the debate about whether a collective entity can express atti-

tudes. Compare Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1520-27 (2000) (arguing that collective entities like "the
state" are capable of expressing attitudes, beliefs, purposes and mental states) with Matthew D.
Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1389 (2000) (arguing that institutions do not possess mental states apart from those of the individuals that comprise them and cannot express meaning apart from that expressed by their actions). My focus
here is on the values that underlie the opinions of the Court, not the expressive intent of either
the Court as an entity (a concept that is obviously problematic) or any of its members, to the
extent that intent is not embodied in the opinion itself.
13Anderson and Pildes argue that "the entire architecture of sovereign immunity and its
qualifications ... appears preeminently concerned with the form and means by which States are
held accountable to federal law." Anderson & Pildes, supra note 12, at 1563.
11Thanks to Eric Posner for pressing me to clarify this issue.
I,See Susan Bancles, Enpathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Ci. L. REV. 361,
366-82 (1996).
16See ht. at 366-67 (stating that "this core insight [about the interrelationship between cognition and emotion] has met with continual resistance in the legal world, which generally subscribes to the formalistic belief that reason can be neatly separated fiom emotion"); see also
Bandes, supra note 6, at 856-57 (discussing pressures on judges to portray "the evolution of doctrine as the linear result of doctrinal logic").
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If so, it is crucial to try to identify those influences most salient in
Garrett and other federalism decisions, and to begin a conversation
about the particular emotional commitments at play here, what vision
of constitutional federalism they engender, and ultimately, whether
they are likely to lead tojust results.
My remarks will turn, first, to the emotive cast of the Court's attitude toward the states. I will suggest that we should pay attention to
this emotive cast because it has explanatory power, and because it has
consequences. Second, I will discuss the intersection between the
Court's reverence toward the states and its attitudes toward the other
actors in Garrett and related federalism decisions_7-specifically its attitudes toward Congress, civil rights plaintiffs, and the Court itself.
The theme of the Supreme Court's recent sovereign immunity jurisprudence might be summarized, to borrow Suzanna Sherry's
phrase, as "states are people too."'8 The states are becoming increasingly anthropomorphized, and the transformation has consequences.
The states are portrayed as people with needs and feelings-dignity
and esteem that must be respected, and rights that must be honored.'" It is becoming increasingly obvious that ensuring the proper
respect for the states' dignity is the central concern underlying the
rapidly expanding doctrine of sovereign immunity,20 eclipsing virtu17 The primary focus will be on the Court's
recent sovereign immunity decisions, particularly
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), but with reference to Kimel v. Florida Board
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 715 (1999), as well. Other doctrinal
areas related to federalism, such as the Tenth Amendment commandeering decisions, will be
briefly mentioned for illustrative purposes.
18Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1121 (2000); see aLso Alden,
527 U.S. at 801-03 (1999) (SouterJ., dissenting) (critiquing the fallacy of assuming that dignity
"is a quality easily translated from the person of the King to the participatory abstraction of a
republican State").
1 Sherry gives several examples, drawn from College Savings Bak v. Florida
Prepaid PosLsecondary Education Expense Board and Alden v. Maine, of the Court's dubious analogies between the
"individual rights" of states and those of citizens, leading to its troubling solicitude for the
states' "rights." Sherry, supra note 18, at 1125-26.
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fl. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overruling
Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), and holding that Congress may not override state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Commerce Clause); Fl. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding patent law was passed pursuant to the Commerce
Clause and was unenforceable as against a state); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fl. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding trademark law was not appropriate legislation
tinder Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and was unenforceable as against a state);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (extending principle of sovereign immunity to bar suits
brought in state court); Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act is not appropriate legislation under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and is not enforceable as against a state); Univ. of Ala. v.Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001) (holding the federal Americans with Disabilities Act is not appropriate legislation tinder the Fourteenth Amendment and is not enforceable as against a state); Fed. Mar.
Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (extending principle of sovereign immunity to bar suits against state entities before federal administrative agencies).
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Scholars have frequently
ally all countervailing considerations.
' attitude to"reverential""
Court's
the
noted, as I discuss elsewhere,"'
ward a concept that, in its current incarnation, is largely unmoored
from constitutional text, dependent on highly contested and "intuitive" 3 historical readings, and, ultimately, "intellectually unfounded
and unjust." 24 In the most recent sovereign immunity case, Federal
Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,2" Justice
Thomas, writing for the majority, not only acknowledges the "barren
historical record 2 " relevant to the question presented (whether states
can be sued before federal administrative agencies), but accuses Justice Breyer, who argues from the historical record, of using "discredited ...ahistorical literalism.,2 Justice Thomas not only acknowledges the irrelevance of the text of the Eleventh Amendment to the
8
question at hand, but derides Justice Breyer for referring to the text
9
in his dissent. Justice Thomas further derides the dissent's reference to one purported purpose of the Eleventh Amendment-the
protection of the states' financial integrity3"-despite the fact that as
recently as 1999, in Alden v. Maine, the Court found this to be a "conJustice Thomas states that "[t]he
sideration[] of great substance.'
preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States
entities. 3 2
the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign
He is undeterred by the fact that the "Framers likely did not envision
the intrusion on state sovereignty at issue," declaring the Court "confident that it is contrary to their constitutional design." 3 When dignity and respect become the overriding elements of constitutional interpretation, it is time to pay them attention in their own right.
The Supreme Court has shown itself to be highly empathetic toward the states' needs and feelings, and not particularly empathetic
21

Bandes, supra note 6, at 877.

2 Daniel A. Farber, Pledginga New Allegiance: An lsay on Sovereignty and the New Federalism,75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1135 (2000).
23

James E. Pfander, Once More Unto the Breach: Eleventh Amendment Scholarship and the Court,

75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 832 (2000).
2- Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

1113, 1118 (2001).
25 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
26 Id. at 974.
27 Id. at 974 n.8.
28 The text of the amendment, justice Breyer notes, refers only to the 'Judicial power." Id. at
988 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2) Id. at 974 n.8 (finding the textual approach "ironic" in light of the lack of textual basis for
the federal agencies).
30Id. at 981 (commenting that the government's reference to the threat to financial integrity "reflects a fundamental mistinderstanding of the purposes of sovereign immunity").
31 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999).
32 Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535
U.S. at 977.
31Id. at 983.

Apr. 2003]

p ]flAR
AND DEGRADA TION IN ALABAMA

toward the effects of the states' wrongful conduct on individuals.
Consider the ways in which the state is portrayed in recent Supreme
Court opinions. Here is Justice Kennedy, in his Garrett concurrence,
describing the situation the state would be in if Garrett's suit for
damages were permitted to proceed. After recognizing that prejudice may arise from insensitivity or lack of reflection as well as malice
or hostile animus, and that government (through legislation, at any
rate) can model more decent perspectives on persons with disabilities, he declaims:
It is a question of quite a different order, however, to say that ...the
States as governmental entities must be held in violation of the Constitution on the assumption that they embody the misconceived or malicious
perceptions of some of their citizens. It is a most serious charge to say a
State has engaged in a pattern or practice designed to deny its citizens
the equal protection of the laws, particularly where the accusation is
based not on hostility but instead on failure to act or the omission to
remedy. States can, and do, stand apart from the citizenry.3

Now compare this to the language the Court uses to describe the
situation of the plaintiff in the suit, Patricia Garrett:
Respondent Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, was employed as the Director of Nursing... for the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital. In 1994, Garrett was diagnosed with breast cancer and subsequently underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and
chemotherapy. Garrett's treatments required her to take substantial
leave from work. Upon returning to work inJuly 1995, Garrett's supervisor informed Garrett that she would have to give up her Director position. Garrett then applied for and received a transfer to another, lower
paying position as a nurse manager.35
There are a number of comparisons one might make between
these descriptions. As a purely quantitative matter, the state and the

indignities it would suffer if sued receive substantially more ink
throughout the opinion than do Patricia Garrett and the hardships
she suffered. Garrett herself gets only the above mention, whereas
the state is the center of attention throughout. As Tony Amsterdam
and Jerome Bruner said in another context, "the principle players are

34
3

531 U.S. 356, 375 (2001) (KennedyJ., concurring).
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 362 (2001) (citations omitted).
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not individuals or groups of human beings but governmental entities .... People do not figure prominently in [this] plot[] ."'6
A comparison of linguistic structure is also instructive. 7 The language about Garrett tends to portray her as an agent acting to bring
on her fate, rather than being acted upon-she undergoes various
treatments, she takes substantial time off from work, she applies for
(and therefore receives) a transfer to another position:" She is portrayed as acting to move to another position, rather than as being
forced to do so. This is all told quite matter-of-factly, although the
factual relevance of her "substantial" time off from work is not explained; the implication that she is somehow at fault here is left unstated, as it must be given that the opinion nowhere contests the assumption that Garrett's treatment violated the ADA. The reader
searching for judicial sympathy or outrage over victimization must
look instead to Justice Kennedy's concurrence. However, the sympathy and outrage in this opinion are not for Patricia Garrett, but for
the state. Justice Kennedy portrays the state, in language that seems
overheated rather than matter of fact, as an innocent victim, unjustly
accused of the serious charge of maliciousness. Here the party is portrayed as passively acted upon. A state is an entity, fulfilling a capacity; it is neutral, it stands apart from its citizens, it takes instruction, it
does not act, but fails to act, fails to revise laws, omits to remedy, fails
to act purposefully, does only what the citizens demand.!) The active
voice is utilized comparatively to demonstrate the absurdity and unfairness of the charge. How could such an entity act with hostility,
embody misconceived or malicious perceptions, or engage in a pattern or practice designed to deny equal protection?"4 Hostility and
malice are thus subtly imported into the analysis; it is easy to miss the
fact that only recently, in the aftermath of Boerne, has Congress had to
prove the existence of these states of mind in order to legislate.
I will return later to the discussion of Patricia Garrett and other
civil rights plaintiffs. My focus here is on the depiction of the states.
Similar comparisons are easily found in the majority opinion in Alden
v. Maine, which is shot through with awed references to the dignity,
esteem and good faith of the sovereign,"' and which speaks in
36 ANTIHONY AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LXW 150 (2000)

(emphasis in

original) ,
This analysis is heavily indebted to Amsterdam and Bruner's work in MINDING THE LAW,
supra note 36. See in particular the authlors' discussion of Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H.
v. Gerald D., id. at 81-102.
38 531 U.S. at 362.

39 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Id.
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 714 ("The federal system ...

reserves to ...

[the States] a substantial

portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes
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shocked tones (evoking the impressments of sailors or the excesses of
the Star Chamber) of the denigration inherent in the "power to press
a State's own courts into federal service to coerce other branches of
the States" which is a power "to turn the state against itself and ...
commandeer the entire political machinery of the state against its
will ..... ,42 The fact that the state had essentially defrauded its probation officers of compensation to which they were entitled is nearly
impossible to discern from the opinion.43
Moreover, the Court treats the states like people who, like other
humans, ought not be held accountable for unlawful discrimination
unless they acted with purpose and malice. This is problematic, first,
because the intent requirement fits poorly with the ways in which
governmental entities cause harm. But in addition, even as the Court
seeks to treat the states as people capable of forming intent, it makes
clear that they are not to be treated entirely like other people. In
fact, they stand apart from other people, and would not stoop to harboring malice. To accuse them of doing so is offensive to their dignity, insulting to their good faith, and damaging to the esteem in
which they deserve to be held.
The doctrine of discriminatory purpose insulates governmental
actions with discriminatory effect from the judicial reach unless they
can be shown to be purposeful. (And now, it will largely insulate
them from the legislative reach as well, at least to the extent that individual plaintiffs will not be able to enforce a ban on such actions
through money damages).44 Discriminatory purpose is more than just
inhering in that status."); id. at 715 ("[States] retain the dignity, though not the full authority,
of sovereignty."); id. ("[T]he [Framers] considered immunity from private stits central to sovereign dignity."); id. at 748-49 ("The principle of sovereign immunity... accords the States the
respect owed them as members of the federation."); id. at 749 (citing Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. at 268, for its recognition of "the dignity and respect afforded a State,
which the immunity is designed to protect").
42 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999). See also Anderson & Pildes, supra
note 12, at
1559 ("The very word 'commandeering' conjures up militaristic images, an extreme exercise of
subordination and invasion justified, if ever, only by the most exigent necessities.").
43 The opinion says merely that the petitioners "alleged the State had violated the overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act." Alden, 527 U.S. at 711.
44 This is despite the fact that the purpose requirement was billed in Washington v.
Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 24748 (1976), as necessitated by the Court's institutional limitations. See David Cole,
The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of
Rights, 1997 Sup. CT. REV. 31, 60 ("[W]here the federal courts fail to enforce a constitutional
norm fully for institutional reasons, Congress should be free to enforce it to that limit.");
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protectionby Law: Federal AntidiscriminationLegislationAfter
Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 467 (2000) (arguing that for this reason the Washington
v. Davis test should not constrain Congress); see also Mark A. Johnson, Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett: A Flawed Standard Yieldst a PredictableResult, 60 MD. L. REX'. 393,
403 (2001) (observing that the purpose requirement as applied in Cleburne was meant to constrain the courts rather than Congress); Note, The IrrationalApplication of Rational Basis: Kimel,
Garrett, and Congressional Power To Abrogate State Sovereigv Immunity, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2146
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awareness of possible consequences; it involves selecting a particular
course of action at least in part because of its adverse affects on an
identifiable group. It is essentially a malice requirement. It inextricably links harm to the intent to commit it, discounting harm that
cannot be traced to particular wrongdoers who have chosen to inflict
it. To the extent the doctrine means to describe the workings of
prejudice, it does so poorly. Prejudice, asJustice Kennedy recognized
in his Garrett concurrence, often arises from indifference or insecurity.4" It is often unconscious, or so deeply imbedded in the social
fabric as to be almost invisible. As Alan Freeman insightfully observed 25 years ago, modern antidiscrimination law "views discrimination not as a social phenomenon, but merely as the misguided conduct of particular actors .... [T]he task of antidiscrimination law is

to separate from the masses of society those blameworthy individuals
who are violating the otherwise shared norm."4" To the extent victims
cannot meet their burden of isolating the particular conditions that
caused their harm, and cannot link them to identified blameworthy
perpetrators, the harm they suffered will be regarded as a mere accident, about which nothing can now be done, "'caused,' if at all, by
the behavior of ancestral demons. '4 7 Thus the law requires proof of
racial animus of a sort that is demonized in our society and, as often
as not, recoils from such proof when it is offered.
Intent requirements are particularly problematic when government wrongdoing is at issue, because they cannot capture the ways in
which government entities cause systemic harm. "' Such harm usually
results, as the Court long ago observed in Owen v. City of Independence,

"not so much from the conduct of any single individual, but from the
interactive behavior of several governmental individuals, each of
whom may be acting in good faith."" Complex entitles tend not to
have motives, and "much of their misconduct is inaction, or a web of
interlocking actions and inactions, which do not fit comfortably

(2001) (arguing that age and disability might be permissible as generic classifications yet impermissible as proxies in individualized determinations).
45 Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374-75 (2001) (Kennedy,J., concurring)
("[Plersons
with mental or physical impairments are confronted with prejudice which can stem from indifference or insecurity as well as from malicious ill will.").
46 Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Dscrismination Through Anti-Discrimination Law:
A
CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1054 (1978).
47 Id. at 1056.
48 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF.
L. REV.
1275, 1335 (1999) ("The common law model misportrays government, thereby thwarting governmental reform."); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mii. L. REV. 2271,
2317-23 (1990) (discussing the analogy between government and the individual).
49 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980).
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within the paradigm of malevolent individuals causing harm by singling out innocent victims."0
Discriminatory purpose requirements, coupled with Kimel and
Garrett's demand that the plaintiff prove a pattern of discrimination
by the states themselves, put Congress in a particularly tight bind
when it seeks to abrogate sovereign immunity. 5' In essence, the
Court's approach requires that for Section 5 to be used to override
sovereign immunity, the state be shown to be blameworthy, the possessor of "malicious perceptions." The state itself must be shown to
have selected a course because of its adverse consequences on a particular protected group. The usual problems of proving discriminatory intent are thus exacerbated by running headlong into the aura
of dignity and esteem surrounding the state. As Alan Freeman explained about the purpose requirement, "it creates a class of 'innocents,' who need not feel any personal responsibility for the conditions associated with discrimination, and who therefore feel great
resentment [at the apparently unjustified stigmatization that occurs]
when [they are] called upon to bear any burdens in connection with
remedying violations." 52 This sense of resentment at unjust stigmatization, and unjust stigmatization of the state, no less, seems to capture Justice Kennedy's high dudgeon in the passage I quoted earlier.
The states stand apart from the citizenry, he tells us. Congress should
not presume to accuse them of harboring the very malice the Court
has just announced it will henceforth require it to demonstrate.
The Court ups the ante even further. The Boerne congruence and
proportionality test requires that, at least when addressing harms that
the Court is not prepared to hold unconstitutional, Congress must
provide for a remedy that is congruent and proportional to the harm
the statute seeks to prevent. That is, if Congress wishes to offer a nationwide remedy, it must prove the existence of a nationwide pattern.5 3 Much hinges, in this formulation, on what sort of pattern the
Court demands-what sorts of incidents may be included, and what
sorts of causal links the Court is willing to recognize among those incidents. In Garrett, the Court, having demanded a pattern of misconduct, proceeds relentlessly to disaggregate the conduct that might
have demonstrated such a pattern, until what Justice Breyer called "a
vast legislative record documenting massive, society-wide discrimination"' has dwindled to what the majority calls several "unexamined,

Bandes, Patternsof Injustice, supra note 48, at 1328.
For trenchant criticism of this requirement, see Caminker, supra note 4, at 1152-54.
52 Freeman, supra note 46, at
1055.
53 Post & Siegel, supra note 44, at 478.
EAUniv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377 (2001) (Breyer,J., dissenting).
5

51
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anecdotal accounts., '' For example, it disaggregates the defendants:
separating state from local wrongdoing, employment discrimination
from discrimination in public services and accommodations.' And it
disaggregates Congress, considering only those accounts submitted to
Congress directly, but not those submitted to its task force 7 Such
decisions are not merely mechanical-they are influenced by nondoctrinal factors, including the emotional factors I have discussed
here.
Consider the Court's insistence that Congress demonstrate a pattern of state misconduct, which fails to take local governmental or
private conduct into account. This insistence is not easily explicable
on doctrinal grounds. Congress issued voluminous findings recognizing a systemic and pervasive pattern of society-wide invidious discrimination, in general and by both state and local government. In
any case, the people who work in state government, as Justice Breyer
observed in dissent, come from the same society as the rest of us, and
it is therefore reasonable to interpret their actions in light of societywide patterns. 's In addition, Congress determined that the most effective way to deter the discrimination at hand is to attack its cause:
"prejudice arising from [the] isolation of the disabled." ' It found
that this was best accomplished by attacking each component of the
overall pattern of discrimination in the delivery of public services, in
order to try for as complete an integration of the disabled into society
as possible.'0 But Justice Kennedy's concurrence calls it "a most serious charge to say a State has engaged in a pattern or practice designed to deny its citizens the equal protection of the laws."61 The
Court sees the state as standing apart from and indeed above the citizenry, rather than as part of the society at large, subject to the same
ignorance and prejudice that afflicts us all. It accords special treatment to states which violate laws that are meant to constrain equally
all those to whom they apply.
The congruence and proportionality requirement raises the possibility that Congress will need to show, not only that the remedy is
directed toward a nationwide problem, but that every state, or at least
55

Id. at 370.

57 Id. For an excellent discussion of the
Court's conception of a legislative record, see generally Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 4, at 152 (arguing, interalia,that the Court is coming close

to adopting a "participation requirement" that all support for legislation must be recorded in

written form diring the legislative process).
58 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 378 (BreyerJ.,
dissenting). See also Kramer, supra note 5, at 150 (noting that the people who work for the state governments come from the same society as the rest
of tIs, and that it is reasonable to interpret their actions in light of society-wide patterns).
59 Hartley, supra
note 2, at 56.
0 Id.
(531 U.S. att 375 (KenniedyJ, conurriniig).
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a majority of states, contributed to that problem, a standard that no
current Section 5 legislation is likely to meet. Alternatively, it may
require Congress to target its remedy only toward those states that
have demonstrated a need for correction. In other words, Congress
would need to single out individual states and make a record stating
that they purposefully discriminated against some (or indeed, many)
of their citizens. The consequences of such a requirement, which
would deny Congress the benefits of nationwide application, are not
hard to predict. Nationwide application reduces the opportunities
for discriminatory line drawing, the imposition of exceptional burdens on particular states, and the danger that federal intervention
will be perceived as unreasonable discrimination against particular
M To amass a record establishing the blameworthistates or regions."
ness of particular states would require the expenditure of tremendous political capital, would be highly divisive, and, in light of the
Court's protective stance toward the states, is likely doomed to failure
in any event.
Thus far I have focused on the Court's protective and reverential
attitude toward the states. However, there are other strong attitudes
at work in Garrett that help explain why the Court anecdotalizes the
conduct at issue and why it ultimately refuses to allow damage suits
against the states. I will speak briefly about the Court's attitudes toward Congress, toward civil rights plaintiffs and the rights they assert,
and toward its own prerogatives.
I first turn to Congress. In the Boerne case, the Court asserts its authority to overrule Congress, which has attempted to assert its own
authority to override the Court's interpretation of the free exercise
clause. I agree with those who discern a certain emotional subtext to
Boerne: it suggests judicial pique at the temerity of Congress."' As
Barry Friedman and Michael Doff put it: Congress slapped the Court,
and the Court slapped back."'" And indeed, it was a public ritual of
"2

6 See Post & Siegel, supra note 44, at 478 (pointing out that, contrary to the Court's
assertion
in Garrett, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Court upheld a nationwide prohibition
on literacy tests despite the absence of state by state findings); see also Samuel Estreicher & Mar-

garet H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of FederalAnti-Discrimination Law,
2000 Sup. Cr. REV. 109, 151 (same).

6. Post & Siegel, supranote 44, at 478.
64 See generally Colker & Brudney, supra note 4, at 126-27 (discussing the
difficulties in amassing a legislative record concerning age discrimination committed by the states).
65 See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 44, at 461 (asserting that the Court was plainly provoked
RFRA).
by
C Michael C. Doff & Barry Friedman, Shared ConstitutionalInterpretation, 2000 Sup. CT. REV.
61, 72.
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sorts: Congress contradicted (or disrespected) the Court quite publicly, and the Court, quite publicly, put it in its place. 7
In Boerne, Congress was straightforward about its motive, which
was to override current Supreme Court precedent in favor of prior
understandings. Later cases colliding with Boerne, such as Kimel and
Garrett, involved legislation that made no such attempt to override or
contradict the Court. If Boerne was a punishment for RFRA, the
Boerne progeny show that the punishment exceeds any crime RFRA
may have committed. " Although each of these decisions contains the
requisite language about the latitude given to Congress to remedy
wrongs," and the deference to which Congress is entitled, the sense
of judicial mistrust for the motives and competence of Congress pervading Boerne can be found in these opinions as well.
Kimel expresses a deep skepticism about what Congress sought to
achieve, referring to that body's "unwarranted response to a perhaps
inconsequential problem."7 In Garrett, the Court seems to question
the sincerity of Congress. It suggests that Congress, rather than acting within its constitutionally defined enforcement powers, was attempting to rewrite Fourteenth Amendment law to advance its own
vision of desirable public policy." It also questions the veracity of
Congress. The Court observes that "had Congress truly understood this
information [that it claimed supported the need for the legislation]
as reflecting a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the states..." it
would have said so in its legislative findings.73 The Court's effort to
allay its mistrust has arguably led to its newly-minted substantive/remedial distinction and its concomitant requirement that legislative remedies exhibit congruence and proportionality, both of
679

67

Neal Devins argues that Congress may have been, and may still be "spurring the Court

into action by signaling its indifference to the constitutional fate of its handiwork."

Neal

Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 50 DUKE

L.J. 435, 436 (2001).
68Commentators suggest that the Court could have struck Boerne down on the ground that
it
"violated Marbury by attempting to dictate the meaning of the Constitution," Colker & Brudney,
supra note 4, at 103; see also Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 62, at 130 (arguing that RFRA could
have been struck down as a violation of United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872)); DarylJ. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 918 (1999) (arguing
that the problem with RFRA was that it made too great a change in free exercise law); a problem that would not have extended to the Boerne progeny.
69 SeeUniv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 365 (2001).
70 See Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S.
507, 517 (1997).
71 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89. See Colker & Brudney, supra note 4, at 108
(discussing the Court's
"deeply skeptical tone" toward the legislative history in Kimel).
7' Garrett,531 U.S.
at 374.
73 Id. at 371.
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which seem designed to police both the motives and the competence
of Congress. 4
75
The often-criticized substantive/remedial distinction relegates
Congress to the role of the Court's handmaiden in effectuating judicially-articulated Fourteenth Amendment norms. The Court's ungenerous reading of Section 5's grant of power seems to bespeak a
low opinion of Congress' unique institutional competence. It essentially reads Congress out of the enterprise of charting and articulating
constitutional meaning.7 6 This cramped role is particularly ironic
given that Section 5 was itself at least partially animated by a mistrust
of the judicial branch, and by the desire to give Congress an independent voice in realizing Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.
Moreover, the Court's conception of the remedial role is static, uncreative: a private-rights notion of remedial power. It is especially unfortunate for institutional reform cases, which require judicial/legislative partnership and a fluid, multi-faceted approach to
complex problems. 78 The Court's new requirement that all Congressional fact-finding be reflected in formal legislative findings reflects a
failure to appreciate the many ways, both formal and informal, in
which Congress educates itse. 7 ' The record requirement also looks
much like a proof requirement-a means of policing Congress to ensure its legislative motives pass musterso (specifically, as Larry Kramer
74 See Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 4, at 97, 136-139 (stating that the Court's new height-

ened scrutiny requirements for legislative record review reflect distrust of the political branches
and their motivations); Caminker, supra note 4, at 1166 (arguing the congruence and proportionality requirement is designed to flush out pretextual legislation by Congress); Colker &
Brudney, supra note 4, at 6 (arguing that the Court's new methodology, which displaces Congress' fact-finding role by transforming factual into legal questions, grows from its increasing
disrespect for Congress); Devins, supra note 4, at 1173 (arguing that the Boerne right/remedy
distinction enables the Court to declare a matter a question of law when it disapproves of Congressional fact-finding); Kramer, supra note 5, at 129-50 (noting the Court's low opinion of
Congress has led to unprecedented constraints on Congress' ability to enforce the Constitution,
including placing of institutional fetters intended for the Court onto Congress).
75 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 44, at 49 (arguing that the Court enunciates no persuasive reason
for the distinction); Levinson, supra note 68, at 915 (arguing that the distinction is descriptively
inaccurate).
76 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 5, at 147 (stating that Garrett largely dispossesses Congress of
power to act tinder the Fourteenth Amendment except in cases of race or gender, which the
Court has already declared suspect classifications; that is, it renders Sec. 5 superfluous); see also
Post & Siegel, supra note 44, at 519-21 (noting that the Court's view divorces the creation of
constitutional meaning from political and social life).
77 SeeAkhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 826 (1999) (arguing thatjust
as Congress sought to constrain future Congressional action with Section 1, it sought to provide
a check on the judiciary through Section 5).
78Levinson, supra note 68, at 873-80. See also Caninker, supra note 4, at 1171 (suggesting
that the Court's "stingy" approach to the Congressional role may undermine the Court's own
ability to implement its vision).
79Colker & Brudney, supra note 4, at 117-19.
80 Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 4, at 137; Devins, supra note 4, at 1173.
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says, the kind of muster a court is capable of reviewing"'). Thus far,
we have had no indication of how much proof will be adequate to
dispel the assumption of improper legislative motives.
The requirement that the remedy be congruent and proportional
also reflects a mixture of disdain for the independent role of
Congress and mistrust of its motives. It seems an effort, albeit a
clumsily-crafted one, both to ensure that the remedy really does
address the evils Congress claims to want to address, and to ensure
that those evils are sufficiently close to those the Court itself thinks
should be addressed. Of course darker motives are also possible.
Boerne and its progeny help inaugurate a shift in the balance of
federal/state power. It is a shift that appears animated by hostility
toward federal supervision of state conduct, and by suspicion of the
existence of the Section 5 power itself.8 These are not motives the
Court can own up to, without reading Section 5 out of the
Constitution entirely."
There is another possible set of unacknowledged motives that may
underlie cases like Kimel and Garrett-ahostility or at least skepticism
toward the underlying rights at stake. This reading is based in part
on what the cases do not say. Earlier I quoted an Amsterdam and
Bruner phrase: "people do not figure prominently in these plots.""4
Their emotional intensity in these opinions is reserved for warding
off harms to the dignity of the states, and, as I will suggest in a
moment, to the dignity of the Court itself. Emotional intensity does
not attach to Patricia Garrett, breast cancer victim, or any of the
other plaintiffs. The language describing disability discrimination in
Garrett or age discrimination in Kimel tends toward the skeptical,
dismissive, sometimes even approving-references to the rationality,
or inconsequentiality, of refusing to provide special accomodations
for the disabled, or of taking age into account in hiring decisions .
There is never a sense in these opinions of a Court engaged in
81 Kramer, supra note 5, at
129-50.
82

Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6; Post & Siegel, supra note 44, at 506-07.

8:1
Caminker, supra note 4, at 1191.
84 See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. v.Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-367 (2001) (discussing rationality of
refusing to accommodate disabled and inadequacy of negative stereotyping as a grounds for
challenge); Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000) (concluding that the Constitution permits states to draw lines based on age even if it is "probably not true" that those reasons
are valid in the majority of cases). See also Colker & Brudney, supra note 4, at 125 (taking issue
with Court's broad notion of rational basis in Kimel); Johanna Pirko, The Erosion of Separation of
Powers Under the"Congruence and Proportionality" Test: From Religious Freedom to the ADA, 53
HASTINGs L.J. 519, 530 (2002) (taking issue with Court's narrow reading of Cleburne and broad
notion of rational basis in Garrett); Post & Siegel, supra note 44, at 522 (arguing that the Court
uses the Boerne test when it "isindifferent or hostile to the constitutional values at stake in particular instances of Section 5 legislation").
85
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figuring out how best to respond to disability or age discrimination;
never a sense of regret at the inability to afford a remedy, or
responsibility for the fate of those left remediless. s6 Indeed, there is
no attempt to offer any account of what the federal role in civil rights
enforcement ought to be.
I suggested earlier that the emotional temperature of these opinions rises mainly when the state's dignity seems threatened. But another source of emotional intensity is discernible as well-the Court's
reaction toward challenges to its own authority. One very noticeable
theme tying together many of the past term's cases, including Garrett,
Velazquez v. Legal Services Corporatin, the INS cases,' United States v.
Dickerson," and Bush v. Gore, is their assertion of judicial supremacy.
As Larry Kramer well described it, this is a supremacy that might better be described as 'Judicial sovereignty,0 2 an insistence that the
Court is the sole arbiter of constitutional meaning. The emotional
valence of Boerne and its progeny bespeaks an exquisite sensitivity to
perceived assaults on the Court's dignity, or even the failure of Congress to pay its proper respects. This is easy to see in Boerne, as I mentioned earlier-the Court feels publicly disrespected, contradicted,
"anxious to squelch any appearance that the views of other branches

See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) ("If the allegations here are true,
no civilized system of justice could fail to provide her a remedy for the conduct of respondent
Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth
of Virginia, and not by the United States."). The problem is that the Violence Against Women
Act was passed in light of a "record of failure at the state level," in order to "provide the choice
of a federal forum in place of the state-court systems found inadequate to stop gender-biased
Post & Siegel, supra note 44, at 523 (disviolence." Id. at 655 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also
cussing the majority's language, and noting that the Court never discusses whether a remedy is
forthcoming from any source).
87 Robert Post and Reva Siegel note that in Kimel, for the first time since the decision in
Brown v. Board of Education,the Court has tried to disaggregate the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment aspects of the effort to protect civil rights, as if they were not part of the
same project. Post & Siegel, supra note 44, at 518. If the civil rights of individuals fall between
the cracks, the Court does not appear particularly concerned.
88532 U.S. 903 (2001) (striking down certain restrictions on advocacy by the Legal Services
Corporation as serious and findamental restrictions on advocacy and on the functioning of the
judiciary).
89 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (invalidatinigjurisdiction-stripping provisions of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act and holding that Act should not be construed to effect
deprivation of judicial forum in the absence of clear, unambiguous language); CalcanoMartinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001) (same).
90 United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (striking down statute designed to override the Court's decision in Mirandav. Arizona as a usurpation of the judicial role).
9 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (halting recount ordered by Florida Supreme Cotrt,
and thereby effectively resolving the presidential election). See Kramer, supra note 5, at 153
(referring to Bush v. Gore as "surely the capstone of the Rehnquist Court's campaign to control
all things constitutional").
92 Kramer, supra note 5, at 13.
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might affect its interpretation."' Perhaps the most important emotional component of these opinions is trust-and lack of trust. They
are pervaded by a strong sense that the Court ought to be the sole
guardian of constitutional meaning, because the Court trusts its own
good judgment most of all."' And it is in its own good faith and
judgment that the Court ultimately asks us to place our trust as well.

9Id. at 130.
91 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 77, at 826 (calling the Court's
"self-confident and selfaggrandizing attitude about [its] interpretive power under the Fourteenth Amendment" difficult to justify); Post & Siegel, supra note 44, at 521 (arguing that the Court assumes, at its peril,
that its own equal protection doctrine is complete, settled, and immune to modification).

